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JON NEWMAN’S THEORY OF DISPARAGEMENT AND THE
FIRST AMENDMENT IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
EDWARD L. RUBIN*
I clerked for Judge Newman during his first year on the Court of
Appeals.  I would like to say that I witnessed the process by which he
developed into a superb appellate judge, but I cannot, because he was
a superb appellate judge from the moment he was appointed.  One
indication of this is the most famous case he decided during that first
year, Pico v. Board of Education, Island Trees Union Free School District No.
26.1 It was a First Amendment matter, always an attention-getter, with
the ACLU as plaintiff’s attorney and, better still for purposes of notori-
ety, an issue whose complexity exceeded its seriousness – the removal
of nine books from a high school library on political grounds.  There
were three separate opinions from the Court of Appeals panel, and the
case went on to the Supreme Court, where it generated no less than
seven separate opinions, none of which commanded a majority.  This
veritable blizzard of high-level judicial declarations, combined with the
failure to resolve the issue, was an ideal stimulus to scholarly analysis.
As a result, Pico was featured in a flurry of law review articles,2  re-
printed in a number of constitutional law casebooks3 and discussed in
the leading constitutional law treatises.4  For closely related reasons, it
* Edward Rubin is a Professor of Law at the University of Pennsylvania Law
School.
1. Pico v. Board of Educ., 638 F.2d 404 (2d Cir. 1980), reh’g denied, 646 F.2d 714
(2d Cir. 1980), aff’d, 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
2. See infra notes 26, 33.
3. E.g., DEAN BRAVERMAN, WILLIAM BANKS & RODNEY SMOLLA, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: STRUCTURE AND RIGHTS IN OUR FEDERAL SYSTEM 1058 (4th ed. 2000); JESSE CHOPER,
RICHARD FALLON, YALE KAMISAR & STEVEN SHIFFRIN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES – COM-
MENTS – QUESTIONS 909 (9th ed. 2001); WILLIAM COHEN & JONATHAN VARAT, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 1415 (11th ed. 2001); NORMAN REDLICH, BERNARD
SCHWARTZ & JOHN ATTANASIO, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1358 (3d ed. 1996); GEOFFREY
STONE, LOUIS SEIDMAN, CASS SUNSTEIN & MARK TUSHNET, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1290
(4th ed. 2001); KATHLEEN SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1251
(14th ed. 2001); WILLIAM VAN ALSTYNE, THE AMERICAN FIRST AMENDMENT IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: CASES AND MATERIALS 347 (3d ed. 2001).
4. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 942
(1997); DANIEL FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 44 (1998); JOHN NOWAK & RONALD RO-
TUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 1649 (6th ed. 2000); RODNEY SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIM-
249
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was cited for a variety of propositions in over one hundred subsequent
federal cases.
Although the judges and scholars who have dealt with the case
have come to various conclusions, one theme that seems to unite them
is that the issue posed by Pico is quite difficult, involving the conflict
between acculturation and indoctrination, between preparation for de-
mocracy and the suppression of autonomy.  What I suggest in this essay
is that Judge Newman’s concurring opinion in the case provides a rela-
tively simple solution to the quandary.5  The position that he first ar-
ticulated was partially relied upon by Justice Blackmun’s separate
opinion in the Supreme Court case and reflected in some of the schol-
arly literature that followed, but it has not been fully assimilated into
the discussion, and its analytic force has not been fully appreciated.
Moreover, while Judge Newman’s solution is straight-forward, its larger
implications for the theory of the First Amendment are profound and
unexplored.  They involve an area that will inevitably become increas-
ingly important as time goes on, namely, the interaction between our
concept of free speech and the modern administrative state.  Part I of
this essay presents the Pico case and considers various alternative ratio-
nales that have been offered for its conclusion.  Part II discusses Judge
Newman’s theory in greater detail, and Part III  focuses on its implica-
tions for the meaning of free speech in an administrative state.
I. THE PICO DECISION AND ITS CRITICS
The issue in Pico is readily stated, but the facts are simply too good
to omit.6  In September 1975, three members of the Island Trees
Board of Education attended a conference sponsored by a conservative
organization entitled People of New York United, or PONY-U.7  One of
the deliverables provided at this conference was a list of objectionable
books, together with excerpts of vulgar passages from these books and
editorial comments about each one, such as “seditious and disloyal,”
“anti-Christian,” and “promotes women’s lib.”  A little less than two
MER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 10.04 [2][a][i] (1994); LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1320 (2d ed. 1988).
5. See Pico, 638 F.2d at 432 (Newman, J., concurring).
6. See id. at 407-12.
7. Judge Newman, responding to the somewhat antic quality of the entire inci-
dent, observed  in the first draft of his opinion that PONY-U was not a institution for the
higher education of small horses. On consideration, he deleted this useful reminder,
over the objection of one of his clerks. See id. at 436 n.6 (explaining acronym).
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months later, the three school board members asked the school custo-
dian to let them into the school library one evening, where they deter-
mined that nine of the books that appeared on the PONY-U list were
on the shelves.  After a series of meetings, the school board decided to
remove the nine books from the high school and the junior high
school libraries, and from the curriculum, on the grounds that they
were “anti-American, anti-Christian, anti-Semetic (sic) and just plain
filthy.”   The books were: A Reader for Writers, by Jerome Archer, Soul on
Ice, by Eldridge Cleaver, A Hero Ain’t Nothing But a Sandwich, by Alice
Childress, The Best Short Stories by Negro Writers, edited by Langston
Hughes, The Fixer, by Bernard Malamud, The Naked Ape, by Desmond
Morris, Down These Mean Streets, by Piri Thomas, Slaughterhouse Five, by
Kurt Vonnegut, and Go Ask Alice (Anonymous).
The District Court gave summary judgment to the defendant
school board.  On appeal, Judge Sifton, writing for the court, began
with the idea that mere removal of books from a school library does
not constitute a prima facie First Amendment violation because of the
wide discretion accorded to school officials.8  But “an unusual and ir-
regular intervention in the school libraries’ operations by persons not
routinely concerned with such matters,”9 he argued, does constitute a
prima facie case.  Thus, the school officials must bear the burden of
establishing an affirmative defense, and this defense must stand up
against the claim that the removal of books on grounds that they are
“filthy,” whatever its justification, is vague and overbroad.  On this ba-
sis, Judge Sifton remanded the case for trial without actually specifying
the doctrinal rule that the trial court should apply.  Judge Mansfield
dissented, relying primarily on the scope of discretion afforded to
school officials and the minimal impact of removing library books on
students’ recognized First Amendment rights.   He also emphasized
the vulgar and offensive nature of the books involved by reprinting in
the margin those passages that the school board had relied upon,
thereby ensuring that Volume 638 of the Federal Reporter would not
appear on the shelves of the school libraries in the Island Trees District
if his opinion prevailed.
Judge Newman, concurring in the result, disputed Judge Mans-
field’s conclusion that the school board’s action fell within its scope of
discretion, and went beyond Judge Sifton’s opinion by articulating the
8. Id. at 412-14.
9. Id. at 414.
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First Amendment principle that the school board had violated.  “[T]he
First Amendment,” he wrote, “does not permit the freedom of the
teacher to become an instrument for suppression of the thoughts of
students.”10  After citing the leading case on student First Amendment
rights, Tinker v. Des Moines,11 he continued: “Those in a school commu-
nity have a right to be free not only from prohibition and unwarranted
regulation of expression.  They have a right to be free from official
conduct that tends to suppress ideas. . . .”12  Not every disapproving
comment, of course, can be considered the suppression of ideas, but
removing books from a school library may well be “the sort of clearly-
defined, school-wide action that carries with it the potential for imper-
missible suppression of ideas.”13  This is particularly the case when the
removal is politically motivated.14  Since a colorable claim was raised
that the removals were politically motivated, but the defendants as-
serted that their motivation stemmed from the sexual content and vul-
garity of the books.  Judge Newman concluded that a trial was needed
to resolve the matter, and he concurred with Judge Sifton on this basis.
In the Supreme Court, Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Mar-
shall and Stevens, affirmed the Court of Appeals decision on a ratio-
nale that differed from Judge Newman’s.  First Amendment
protection, Justice Brennan said, includes a right to receive informa-
tion, and school students are not excluded from this protection.15  A
school must exercise control over its curriculum, of course, but a
school library is a different matter.  Its use is entirely voluntary on the
students’ parts, and it affords them “an opportunity at self-education
and individual enrichment that is wholly optional.”16  Thus, if the
school board removed the books from the school library because they
intended to deny students access to the ideas in those books, then it
had violated the First Amendment.  Justice Brennan emphasized the
narrowness of his opinion, noting that “nothing in our decision today
affects in any way the discretion of a local school board to choose
10. Id. at 433.
11. Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (holding that students
had a First Amendment right to wear black armbands to protest the Vietnam War, re-
gardless of school regulations to the contrary).
12. Pico, 638 F.2d at 433.
13. Id. at 434.
14. Id. at 434-35.
15. See Pico 457 U.S. at 866-69 (1982).
16. Id. at 869.
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books to add to the libraries of their respective schools.”17  Justice
Blackmun concurred, but adopted a rationale similar to that of Judge
Newman’s.  Justice Blackmun denied that the state “has any affirmative
obligation to provide students with information or ideas, something
that may well be associated with a ‘right to receive.’”18  Instead, he
concluded that “the State may not act to deny access to an idea simply
because state officials disapprove of that idea for partisan or political
reasons.”19  Justice White also concurred in affirming the Court of Ap-
peals, thus constituting a majority, on the ground that there were con-
tested issues of fact that should be tried.20
There were four separate dissents.  Chief  Justice Burger’s dissent,
in which Justices Powell, Rehnquist and O’Connor joined, argued that
the plurality opinion interfered with the discretion of school boards
and failed to explain why its right to receive rationale would be limited
to the removal of books from the school library, as opposed to the
acquisition of books or the design of the curriculum.21  Justice Powell
wrote separately to emphasize that “[s]chool boards are uniquely local
and democratic institutions,”22 and to append Judge Mansfield’s re-
print of the offensive passages.  The most substantive dissent was Jus-
tice Rehnquist’s, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell.  In
addition to arguing that the plurality opinion attributed political moti-
vations to the school board that were not justified by the record, he
argued that the right to receive was not applicable to the educational
setting.  Schools must make substantive choices, he said, stressing that
“elementary schools and secondary schools are inculcative in nature.
The libraries of such schools serve as supplements to this inculcative
role.”23  The government, in its role as educator, he argued, is subject
to fewer First Amendment restrictions than it is in other capacities.24
What emerges from this welter of opinions is the Supreme Court’s
declaration that removal of books from a school library raises First
17. Id. at 871 (emphasis in original).
18. Id. at 878.
19. Id. at 878-79.
20. On remand, the case was settled because the Island Trees School Board
agreed to return the books to the library. See DAVID MOSHMAN, CHILDREN, EDUCATION
AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT: A PSYCHOLEGAL ANALYSIS 122 (1989).
21. Id. at 885-93.
22. Id. at 894.
23. Id. at 915.
24. Id. at 920.  Justice O’Connor also wrote a brief dissent which reiterated a few
of Justice Rehnquist’s arguments.  Id. at 921.
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Amendment concerns because such action potentially violates the stu-
dents’ right to receive information.  Subsequent federal cases regularly
cite Pico for this principle.25  However, the dissenters and various com-
mentators have noted that this is not a particularly convincing ratio-
nale.26  To begin with, it can be easily challenged with law-school style
hypotheticals.  For example, suppose a school board, having replaced
astronomy with environmental studies in the high school curriculum,
then decided to remove the astronomy books from the school library.
Or suppose the school board found that an idiosyncratic junior high
school librarian had ordered multiple volumes of Hegel’s works, and
decided to remove them because “they were not appropriate for the
students,” or “the students were not ready for them.”  Even the prof-
fered rationale of the Island Tress School Board – that the removed
books were inappropriately vulgar – would have passed constitutional
muster had it been believed, or so the plurality implied.27  Clearly, the
government could not prohibit citizens from reading astronomy, or
Hegel, or even vulgarity, and courts would unproblematically invoke
the right to receive against any effort to do so.  But it seems hard to
believe that any court would find that the removal of these books from
the school library, at least for the indicated reasons, violated the First
Amendment.  The basic problem, of course is that there is a great dif-
ference between allowing people to obtain a particular book and re-
quiring the state to supply it.  There is a further difference between
requiring the state to supply a particular book in a context where it is
supplying books in general, such as a public library, and requiring it to
supply a particular book in a specialized setting.  Surely, to indulge in
one further hypothetical, it would not violate the First Amendment to
remove copies of Hegel, or even Slaughterhouse Five, that had somehow
25. See Satellite Broad. & Communications Assoc. v. FCC, 275 F.3d 337, 353 (4th
Cir. 2001); Monteiro v. Tempe Union High School Dist., 158 F.3d 1022, 1027 (9th Cir.
1988); Gregg v. Barrett, 771 F.2d 539, 547 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Schuloff v. Fields, 950 F.
Supp. 66, 68 (E.D.N.Y. 1997); Providence Journal Co. v. City of Newport, 665 F. Supp.
107, 111 (D.R.I. 1987); Brown v. Bd. of Regents, 640 F. Supp. 674, 678 (D. Ne. 1986);
Democratic Party of the United States v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 578
F. Supp. 797, 820 (E.D.Pa. 1983); Am. Future Sys. v. Penn State Univ., 568 F. Supp. 666,
670 (M.D. Pa. 1983); see also Brophy v. Town of Costine, 534 A.2d 663, 664 (Me. 1987).
26. See, e.g., Moshman, supra note 20, at 130-31; Mark Yudof, Library Book Selection
and the Public Schools: The Quest for the Archimedean Point, 59 IND. L.J. 527, 545-48 (1983)
[hereinafter Yudof, Library Book Selection].
27. 457 U.S. at 871.
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found their way into the art history library of a government-run
museum.
Because the plurality opinion by the Court fails to withstand analy-
sis, a number of commentators have offered alternative rationales.
Mark Yudof suggests that the aspect of the Pico case that triggers First
Amendment scrutiny is that the Island Trees School Board circum-
vented the ordinary procedures for selecting or removing books from
the school libraries.28  “If higher authorities have no policy on book
assignment or selection and thereby delegate such authority on a de
facto basis to teachers and librarians, they cannot later intervene in an
ad hoc manner to limit the dissemination of books or their acquisi-
tion.”29   This is an interesting argument in that it addresses the admin-
istrative structure of the school system, an obvious reality to anyone
involved in public education, but something that often disappears
from view when a court speaks of “the school board” or “local govern-
ment” the way the Burger, Powell and Rehnquist dissents do.  Moreo-
ver, it is a flexible approach, since the intervention by superior
authorities could be regarded either as an improper breach of proce-
dure or as a event that triggers scrutiny on the basis of some further
constitutional provision like the First Amendment.
One difficulty with Yudof’s rationale, however, is that it is essen-
tially procedural and imposes no substantive First Amendment limita-
tions.  It would allow the school board to remove books on any basis,
including ideological unacceptability, if it had not delegated authority
to subordinate officials, or if it had established rules specifying the ar-
eas of unacceptability, or even, perhaps, if it had established rules spec-
ifying its ability to intervene.  In this respect, it parallels the rather
questionable line of due process cases holding that state officials can
avoid creating any liberty or  property rights, and thereby avoid the
requirement of the due process clause, by simply not establishing crite-
ria to cabin their discretion.30  An even more serious problem is that it
establishes, some sort of constitutional protection for the unencum-
28. MARK YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLITICS, LAW, AND GOVERNMENT EX-
PRESSION IN AMERICA 243-44 (1983) [hereinafter Yudof, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS];
Yudof, Library Book Selection, supra note 26, at 553-59.
29. Yudof, Library Book Selection, supra note 26, at 555.
30. See, e.g., Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438 (1979) (lawyer has no property interest in
right to appear in court); cf. Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55 (1979) (licensee has property
interest in license because statute established rules for its removal); Memphis Light, Gas
& Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1 (1978) (subscriber has property interest in continued
utility service because terms for its revocation were established).  These cases have been
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bered exercise of authority by subordinate officials; it established, in
Professor Yudof’s phrase, an “irrevocable delegation.”31   This may be a
proper description of the relationship between a jurisdiction-granting
legislature and a court, a relationship which of course pre-dates the
administrative state.  In an administrative state, however, ordinary as-
signments of authority to subordinate officials should not be character-
ized in this manner.  Very few administrative delegations are
irrevocable; intervention to countermand a subordinate’s decision,
when that decision is regarded as unwise, is a standard mode of super-
vision.  To forbid or even disfavor such interventions would hobble the
ordinary process of administration and further insulate subordinate of-
ficials who are already insulated by the brute scale and complexity of
their specific tasks.  It would create perverse incentives to promulgate
unnecessary rules or declarations that purportedly denied subordi-
nates the authority they actually possessed.  Of course, the image of the
political superior who intervenes in an administrative decision in re-
sponse to political pressure is an unappealing one, but the counter-
vailing situation occurs when a superior intervenes to countermand a
decision that is short-sighted, ill-considered, biased, or corrupt.  It
would be difficult to say which situation is more common – and the
characterization would inevitably depend upon one’s point of view –
but the preference for the latter characterization is built into our en-
tire structure of government.  Interventions become unacceptable
when they violate some substantive standard that is independent of the
intervention process itself.  The truly troublesome aspect of the school
board’s action in Pico is not that it intervened, but that its intervention
seems to offend some aspect of the First Amendment.
Another alternative rationale is to acknowledge that schools inevi-
tably inculcate values but  that the acceptable range of values was ex-
ceeded in this case.  In fact, Pico is regularly cited by courts for the
proposition that schools necessarily promote values.32  Many scholars
not only accept this situation, but argue that it is desirable – the
schools, in their view, should promote the values that serve as the basis
partially rejected with respect to the liberty interest, see, e.g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480
(1980) (certain liberty interests are inherent in the due process clause).
31. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS, supra note 28, at 240-45; Yudof, Library
Book Selection, supra note 26, at 553.
32. See, e.g., Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998); Henerey
v. City of St. Charles, 200 F.3d 1128, 1130 (8th Cir. 1999); Amatel v. Reno, 156 F.3d 192,
197 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Bystrom v. Fridley High Sch., 822 F.2d 747, 751 (8th Cir. 1987);
Board. of Ed. v. Wilder, 960 P.2d 695, 702 (Colo. 1998).
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for a democratic polity.33  It is difficult to dispute this view, if only be-
cause it is virtually inconceivable that publicly operated schools in a
functioning society would teach values that are antithetical to the ones
that underlie that society’s political system.  But none of this resolves
the problem raised by Pico.  To put the matter in the simplest terms, a
school would not be a school if it did not have a curriculum, and there
is no question that a curriculum must be based on, and attempt to
communicate, a large number of values.  But a school does not need to
remove books from its library, at least on any substantive grounds.
Conversely, a school could do a great deal of values inculcation with-
out removing library books.   This is not an effort to side-step the prob-
lem of values in the educational process, which is important and
complex, but to avoid side-stepping the actual issue that is raised by the
case.  The removal of books from the library on substantive grounds is
not an intrinsic part of the educational process; it is an unusual occur-
rence – one that will typically involve the kinds of departures from
ordinary procedures that Yudof notes – and it opens a window on an
essentially different aspect of our First Amendment theory.  There is,
to be sure, a point of contact with the issue of values inculcation in the
curriculum, but that is best explored after the basic issue raised by Pico
has been addressed.
II. JUDGE NEWMAN’S THEORY OF DISPARAGEMENT
According to Judge Newman’s concurring opinion in Pico, the
real First Amendment problem with the school board’s actions is that
the board, assuming the respondents’ claims were proven at trial, was
33. AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 44-65 (1987); George Bereday, Values,
Education and the Law, 48 MISS. L.J. 585 (1977); Susan Betinsky, A Contemporary Proposal
for Reconciling the Free Speech Clause With Curriculum Values Inculcation in the Public Schools,
70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 769 (1995); David Diamond, The First Amendment and Public
Schools: The Case Against Judicial Intervention, 59 TEX. L. REV. 477 (1981); Robert Gordon,
Freedom of Expression and Values Inculcation in the Public School Curriculum, 13 J.L. EDUC.
523 (1984);  Bruce Hafen, Schools as Intellectual and Moral Associations, 1993 B.Y.U. L.
REV. 605; Stanley Ingber, Socialization, Indoctrination, or the “Pall of Orthodoxy”: Value
Training in the Public Schools, 1987 U. ILL. L. REV. 15; Betsy Levin, Educating Youth for
Citizenship: The Conflict Between Authority and Individual Rights in the Public Schools, 95 YALE
L.J. 1647 (1986); Joel Moscowitz, The Making of the Moral Child: Legal Implications of Val-
ues Education, 6 PEPP. L. REV. 105 (1978); Michael Rebell, Overview: Education and the
Law: Schools, Values, and the Courts, 7 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 275 (1989); Suzanna Sherry,
Responsible Republicanism, Educating for Citizenship, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 131 (1995); R.
George Wright, Free Speech Values, Public Schools and the Role of Judicial Deference, 22 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 59 (1987).
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trying to suppress ideas.  Removal of the books from the school library
did not significantly interfere with the students’ ability to read those
books, all of which were readily available at public libraries and book-
stores, many in inexpensive paperback editions.  But the action, “a de-
liberate decision, taken by leading school officials,”34 was not designed
to prevent students from gaining access to the books.  Rather, it was
designed to disparage the ideas that the books expressed, that is, to
suggest that they were not simply wrong but unacceptable.35   In con-
temporary terms, the removal was an act of expressive speech by the
government.36  Matthew Adler points out that this concept seems un-
likely to provide the kind of general insight into our legal system that
its proponents claim,37 but it is applicable to certain situations, and
Pico is one of them.  As Judge Newman wrote: “[t]he symbolic effect of
a school’s action in removing a book solely because of its ideas will
often be more significant than the resulting limitation upon access to
it.”38
The fact that this act of occurred in a school context, where stu-
dents are properly under the immediate and continuous supervision of
government authorities, makes the symbolism more difficult to sepa-
rate from valid governmental functions.  “It is not a First Amendment
violation every time a teacher tells a student not to speak, nor does a
school administrator violate the First Amendment every time he in-
cludes one subject in the educational curriculum and excludes an-
34. Pico, 638 F.2d at 419.
35. The Supreme Court’s plurality opinion did contain some language that re-
flected this rationale. See 457 U.S. at 870-71.  “Our Constitution does not permit the
official suppression of ideas.  Thus whether petitioners’ removal of the books from their
school libraries denied respondents their First Amendment rights depends upon the
motivation behind the petitioners’ actions.” Id. at 871 (emphasis in original).  But this
statement was set within the context of a right to receive and the special status of school
libraries.  Justice Blackmun’s concurrence states the rationale more directly.  See id. at
875.
36. For discussions of this concept, see Dan Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions
Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591 (1996); Dan Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning and
Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349 (1997); Larry Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U.
CHI. L. REV. 943 (1995); Richard Pildes & Richard Niemi, Expressive Harms, “Bizarre Dis-
tricts,” and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92
MICH. L. REV. 483 (1993); Richard Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps: Social Meanings,
Expressive Harms, and Constitutionalism, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 725 (1998); Cass Sunstein, On
the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021 (1996).
37. Matthew Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L.
REV. 1363 (2000).
38. Pico, 638 F.2d at 419.
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other.”39  That is the reason why Judge Newman wanted to remand the
case for trial.  But the plaintiff’s allegations, if proven, would have
demonstrated that the school board, in a high-profile decision, singled
out certain books from the library on the basis of their content and
ordered them removed.  “It is one thing to teach, to urge the correct-
ness of a point of view.  But it is quite another to take any action that
condemns an idea, that places it beyond the pale of free discussion and
scrutiny.”40  This effort to disparage particular ideas is the symbolic
meaning of the school board’s action that renders it a violation of the
First Amendment.  “Perhaps no single event has more evocative power
to signal the suppression of free speech than the burning of a book.”41
“Removing a book from a school library is a less offensive act, but it can
also pose a substantial threat of suppression.”42
Judge Newman’s disparagement rationale avoids the tortured ef-
fort of the Supreme Court plurality to explain why school libraries are
unique and distinct from the school classroom.43   Several lower courts
struggled with this distinction,44 and one provided a memorable, if not
particularly practicable formulation of the concept: “Pico indicates that
some of the First Amendment freedoms retained at the schoolhouse
gate may be shed at the classroom door.”45  According to the dispar-
agement rationale, however, there is nothing special about school li-
braries; they simply constitute one context where disparagement of
ideas by state officials might occur.  Similarly – and here the Supreme
39. Id. at 432.
40. Id. at 432-33 (footnote omitted).
41. Id. at 432.
42. Id. at 434.  One of the few cases that followed the disparagement rationale, V.I.
Wexner v. Anderson Union High School Board of Trustees, 258 Cal. Rptr. 26 (Cal. Ct. App.
1989), has been de-published under California law.  During its evanescent existence, it
said: “The problem is all the more serious because the type of action, book banning, is
the archetypical symbol of repression of free speech and because it occurs, in a manner
of speaking, ‘in front of the children.’” Id. at 32.
43. Bd. of Ed., 457 U.S. at 868.  The plurality described the school library as “a
place dedicated to quiet, to knowledge, and to beauty.’” Id. (quoting Brown v. Louisi-
ana, 383 U.S. 131, 142 (1966)).  It is difficult to believe that anyone who could write
these words, or subscribe to them, was ever a student in a school with a school library.
If the plurality’s opinion rests on the accuracy of this characterization, it is vulnerable
indeed.
44. Burch v. Barker, 861 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir. 1988); Romano v. Harrington, 725 F.
Supp. 687 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).
45. Romano, 725 F. Supp. at 690.
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Court plurality became more tortured still46 – there is nothing special,
within the context of a school library, about the removal of books as
opposed to their acquisition.  The crucial question is the message that
the government officials’ actions are communicating, a message that
will be determined by the tremendous resources of meaning construc-
tion that are available to people in any functioning society.47
The removal of books from a school library, as Judge Newman
wrote, may be “a casual, insignificant decision, as when the school li-
brarian replaces an obsolete book, or discards a rarely-used one to
make shelf space available for other volumes.”48  Even if the librarian
harbored secret, ideological reasons, for removing books, there would
be no First Amendment violation if he never revealed those reasons,
and the pattern of removal that they produced never became appar-
ent.  His ideological reasons would simply disappear within the ac-
knowledged range of his authority to make decisions and would be
numbered among the many improper but fugitive thoughts that flit
through the minds of all government officials as they go about their
tasks.  It is only when the removal is a deliberate and publicized deci-
sion, couched in ideological terms, that it acquires the symbolic power
to disparage and suppress ideas, and becomes equivalent to a low-tem-
perature book burning.
The acquisition of books is likely to be an even less significant and
less notorious decision, since there are only a few reasons to remove a
book but innumerable reasons for not buying one.  Nonetheless, fail-
ure to acquire can be used to send the same impermissible message.  If
the school board, for example, announces that it is instructing all li-
brarians in the district to avoid acquiring any book that champions
women’s liberation, it is using acquisitions policy to disparage an idea.
The mode of expression is different, but the message is essentially the
46. 457 U.S. at 871 (“Nothing in our decision today affects in any way the discre-
tion of a local school board to choose books to add to the libraries of schools.”) (em-
phasis in original).  This language is impossible to reconcile with the rationale for the
decision.
47. See, e.g., PIERRE BOURDIEU, OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF PRACTICE (Richard Nice,
trans., 1977); ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1959);
EDMUND HUSSERL, LOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS (J.N. Findlay, trans., 1973); KARL POLANYI
AND HARRY PROSCH, MEANING (1975); MARSHALL SAHLINS, CULTURE AND PRACTICAL REA-
SON (1976); ALFRED SCHUTZ, THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL WORLD (George
Walsh & Frederick Lehnert, trans., 1967); MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 3-62
(Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich, eds., 1978).
48. Pico, 638 F.2d at 419.
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same as an announcement that already-acquired books are being re-
moved, and it represents the same violation of the First Amendment.
Similarly, the content of the classroom curriculum, far from being an
area of greater school board discretion, as the plurality opinion sug-
gested,49 presents even greater opportunities for the disparagement of
ideas, and requires greater First Amendment scrutiny.  If the school
board declared that nothing may appear in the curriculum that favors
the redistribution of wealth or the revocation of environmental regula-
tion, it would have committed the same constitutional sin of attempt-
ing to suppress idea through the technique of disparagement.
Disparagement is thus a concept that cuts across all areas of gov-
ernmental operations.  While it is certainly true, as Robert Post ob-
serves, that different modes of governmental action create different
demands, particularly in the First Amendment area,50 it is also true
that there are certain underlying types of action that vary in their par-
ticulars but are united by their socially constructed meaning.  There
are many ways for the government to disparage ideas, each usable and
potentially effective in certain particular settings; the crucial question
is whether the action under consideration could be understood as
such by the citizens who are the targets of the government’s symbolic
communication.  This consideration provides a principle that courts
can apply with some degree of coherence in distinguishing between
permissible and impermissible modes of government speech.  The Su-
preme Court has acknowledged that the general requirement of con-
tent neutrality is inapplicable to the kinds of government-managed
institutions that characterize the administrative state.51  To run a
school, a theater, or a museum requires content-based decisions about
what will be included or excluded, and how the included material will
be presented.  But these decisions, while embodying choices about the
things that the government considers valuable, and even providing
symbolic messages about social value in general, need not disparage
the ideas that have been excluded.  When the government crosses this
second line, when it indicates that certain ideas are not only undesir-
able but unacceptable, it violates the First Amendment.
49. See Bd. of Ed., 457 U.S. at 861-62.
50. ROBERT POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY, MANAGE-
MENT (1995).
51. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Hazelwood Sch.
Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988); see also Bruce C. Hafen, Hazelwood School District
and the Role of First Amendment Institutions, 1988 DUKE L.J. 685 (1988).
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To trace this principle through leading First Amendment deci-
sions would require a more extensive essay, but its operation can be
illustrated by considering some of the federal cases that have claimed
to follow Pico.  In Bowman v. Bethel-Tate Board of Education,52  the Dis-
trict Court, citing Pico, held that the school board violated the First
Amendment when it prohibited third grade students from presenting
a play called “Sorcerer and Friends” because the play “glorifie[d] cow-
ardice, denigrate[d] patriotism, and disparage[d] the aged.”53  The
play did not involve the features that the Supreme Court plurality iden-
tified in its reverential description of school libraries,54 but, as a volun-
tary, after-school activity, it did not fall within the curricular area where
school board control is regarded as so important.55  Nonetheless, the
Bowman court’s decision is correct; the school board’s prohibition of
the play based on its ideas represents the same sort of disparagement
as the removal of the books in Pico.
The prohibition in Pratt v. Independent School District No. 83156 did
involve the curriculum. The school board in the case decided to re-
move a film version of Shirley Jackson’s short story, “The Lottery,”
from the high school literature curriculum based on objections by par-
ents that the film posed “a threat to the students’ religious beliefs and
family values.”57  The Court of Appeals was unencumbered by the Su-
preme Court’s opinion in Pico, which had not yet appeared, and fol-
lowed Judge Newman’s analysis.  Although Pratt involved the
curriculum, and the Court of Appeals acknowledged the authority of
the school board in this area, it presented the same issue of disparage-
ment.  By removing the film from the curriculum, the school board
was declaring that “the ideas contained in the film are unacceptable
and should not be discussed or considered”58 but instead should be
suppressed – even though discussion was exactly what the film and its
attendant curricular materials were designed to foster.  Thus, the fact
that the film was included in the curriculum made no difference.
While the school board could certainly have removed course materials
52. 610 F. Supp. 577 (S.D. Ohio 1985).
53. Id. at 579.
54. Id. at 580-1.
55. Id.
56. 670 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1982).
57. Id. at 776-77.  In the story, the inhabitants of a small town annually stone one
person, selected by lottery, to death, in obedience to tradition.  The story can certainly
be read as a condemnation of religious dogmatism.
58. Id. at 779.
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from the curriculum for a variety of reasons, or for no reason at all, it
could not do so when the removal was being used as a symbolic action
indicating that certain ideas should be suppressed.59
In contrast, PMG International Division v. Cohen60 upheld a prohibi-
tion against the sale of sexually explicit material at military post ex-
changes.  The District Court distinguished Pico on the ground that it
occurred in a school context rather than a military base, and that it
dealt with the removal, rather than the acquisition of material.
Neither of these distinguishing factors is relevant however because the
preferable rationale for the District Court’s conclusion is that the ex-
clusion of sexually explicit material was not understood as disparaging
any particular ideas.61  Therefore, the government was not engaging in
prohibited viewpoint discrimination.62
The dispute in Bell v. U-32 Board of Education,63 like Bowman, in-
volved the prohibition of a student play, in this case a portrayal of life
on the street entitled “Runaways.”64  The play was to be presented to
the entire school community by junior high and high school students
and the presentation, for which the performers received academic
credit, was considered “part of the curriculum.”65  The school board
prohibited the presentation on the ground that the play “involved in-
appropriate activity for the students who would be involved in perform-
ing and producing the play and would be inappropriate viewing as a
school-sponsored event for the school community and the community
at large.”66  But, as the District Court noted, the text of the play contin-
ued to be available in the school library, and to be “used as a text in a
humanities course.”67  The court did not provide much of a rationale
for its decision, other than a vague invocation of societal values and
school board discretion, for which it cited Pico, but it could have done
so by relying on the disparagement principle.  Although the U-32
school board had prohibited production of a play, it had done so
based on the propriety of presenting it, not on the basis of its ideas.
59. Id. at 776.
60. 57 F. Supp. 2d 916 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
61. Id. at 919.  The Court also held that a military post exchange is not a public
forum.  That aspect of the case is beyond the scope of this essay.
62. Id. at 919.
63. Bell v. U-32 Bd. of Educ., 630 F. Supp. 939 (D. Vt. 1986).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 941.
66. Id. at 942.
67. Id.
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The continued availability of the play’s text in the library, and its con-
tinued use in the curriculum, effectively counteracted any implication
that the school board’s real intention was to disparage the ideas in the
play.  In other words, the symbolic meaning of the school board’s ac-
tion, when understood within the social context of the various partici-
pants, was not the constitutionally forbidden one of disparaging ideas.
Although the disparagement principle is broad in application, it is
narrow in focus.  Disparagement is a mode of governmental speech,
which is itself a problematic type of governmental action.  There is a
substantial body of scholarly literature addressing the First Amend-
ment problems that are created when the government is the speaker,
rather than the regulator of privately-generated speech.68  Some of this
speech shares with disparagement the feature of expressing negative
opinions of ideas.  Despite this similarity, disparagement is a useful
conceptual category because it raises unique difficulties that these
other modes of government speech do not present, and is distinguisha-
ble on that basis.  In particular, disparagement is distinguishable from
viewpoint discrimination and political criticism.
To begin with viewpoint discrimination, the Supreme Court, while
acknowledging the need for content discrimination in the operation of
an institution, has regularly declared that viewpoint discrimination is
unconstitutional.69  This latter principle apparently applies when the
government authorizes, subsidizes or taxes private speakers, rather
than generating speech on its own.  It further forbids the government
from making choices among speakers on the basis of their point of
view.
However, as Robert Post points out, neither the distinction be-
tween government-initiated and government-sponsored speech, nor
the distinction between content and viewpoint discrimination, is co-
herent.70  In managing an institution, the government cannot be neu-
68. See Abner Greene, Government of the Good, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2000); Robert
Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 151 (1996). Frederick Schauer, Is Government Speech
a Problem, 35 STAN. L. REV. 373 (1983); Steven Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 UCLA L.
REV. 565 (1980); Mark Tushnet, Talking to Each Other: Reflections on Yudof’s When Govern-
ment Speaks, 1984 WIS. L. REV. 129 (1984); Yudof, Library Book Selection, supra note 26;
YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS, supra note 28.
69. See Rosenberger v. Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S.  819 (1995); Lamb’s Chapel v.
Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993); Arkansas Writers’ Project
v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987); Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington,
461 U.S. 540 (1983).
70. Post, supra note 68.
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tral.  It must both initiate its own speech and make judgments about
the speech of the people who comprise the institution, and it must do
so on the basis of both content and viewpoint.71  What it need not do is
proclaim that the reason for its choices is that the rejected or disfa-
vored ideas are unacceptable or that they are beyond the limits of ac-
ceptable discourse.  This additional message offends the First
Amendment because it is intended to suppress ideas rather than to
implement a program or operate an institution.
Those who did not receive government grants, have their artwork
displayed in public museums, or their plays produced in public thea-
ters might feel that their ideas had been rejected and might even at-
tempt to modify them in an effort to do better the next time around.
Such reactions might be an inevitable concomitant of a government
funding program, particularly if the funding agency possesses some
prestige.  There are, however, other venues that support the promulga-
tion of ideas and, for some of these, a person’s failure to obtain public
support might be a reason to provide alternative support on a private
basis.  However, if the funding agency not only rejects but disparages,
if it indicates that the applicant’s ideas are simply unacceptable, then
there is a strong likelihood that many of these private sources will be
foreclosed.  Even if the government monopolizes speech by operating
all the universities or all the theaters – a situation that obviously creates
problems of its own – there is still a difference between rejection and
disparagement.  Rejection may deny the applicant a chance to present
his views to the general public, but it still leaves him safe in the posses-
sion and expression of those views.  Disparagement does not.
Additionally, disparagement can be distinguished from the sort of
criticism that inevitably occurs in political debate.  As Mark Yudof and
others have observed,72 public officials in our system of government
are required to state their decisions and explain their reasons.  Con-
sider, for example, a state governor who decided to take a position on
a controversy about whether the state parks should be made available
for an expanded range of  recreational and commercial uses or
whether the parks’ ecology should be preserved from human interfer-
ence.  She could try to avoid governmental speech by privately in-
structing the state parks commissioner to grant licenses for new
71. Post, supra note 68, at 166-67; Shiffrin, supra note 68, at 572-74.
72. Yudof, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS, supra note 28, at 20-50; David Cole, Beyond
Unconstitutional Conditions: Charting Spheres of Neutrality in Government-Funded Speech, 67
N.Y.U. L. REV. 675, 739 (1992); Greene, supra note 68, at 8-12.
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recreational and commercial uses or, alternatively, by instructing him
to stop granting licenses and cancel as many of the existing ones as
possible.  If new legislation were required to achieve these policies, she
could privately contact influential legislators and urge them to enact
the necessary statute.  Such efforts to avoid governmental speech, how-
ever, are hardly conducive to the kind of political system we desire, a
system that is open to public debate about the issues and responsive to
citizen demands.  It is not sufficient that the governor is an elected
official.  That status does not give her carte blanche in our system to take
whatever actions she chooses without further public input.  The
processes of public debate and lobbying both political and administra-
tive decision makers are as central to our system of governance as the
choice of public officials by election.73  For this system to function,
public officials must speak; they must declare their positions and pre-
sent the arguments that favor those positions.
Such speech by government officials necessarily involves criticism
of the opposing point of view.  How could the governor possibly ex-
plain why she favored increasing the recreational and commercial uses
of the parks without criticizing the views of the ecologists; how could
she possibly explain an effort to protect the parks’ ecology without crit-
icizing the effort to increase human use?  In fact, people are often
more clear about their reasons for disliking an opposing view than they
are about their reasons for adopting the one they favor.  People who
do not know very much about ecology may nonetheless have strong
feelings about having a bunch of beer-guzzling yahoos tooling around
the state parks in snowmobiles.  To craft any rule that attempted to
eliminate or dampen spirited criticism of opposing positions would
certainly hobble a public official’s efforts to explain her position, and
probably reduce them to incoherence.  To use constitutional litigation
to enforce a rule of this nature would convert the courts into a brood-
ing  editorial presence in the sky.
This necessary criticism can be readily distinguished from dispar-
agement.  Criticism simply states that a particular view is wrong or that
it should not be followed.  Disparagement declares that this view is un-
acceptable, that it is beyond the limits of acceptable debate and accept-
able thought.  Although they share certain features, these two types of
governmental speech are polar opposites in the sense that criticism
embodies public debate, while disparagement impedes it.  Most Ameri-
73. See Edward L. Rubin, Getting Past Democracy, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 711 (2001).
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can politicians have criticized communism at some point in their ca-
reers,  but it was Joseph McCarthy who undertook to disparage it, to
suppress the idea of communism by insisting that it was outside the
boundaries of acceptable discourse.74
This example of Senator McCarthy may seem extreme, particu-
larly in light of the apparent fecklessness of the Island Trees School
Board,75 and there is certainly a countervailing phenomenon that offi-
cial disapproval, if it lacks force or prestige, can lend the disparaged
work a particular appeal.  Motion picture producers often sprinkle a
few of the words that shocked Judge Mansfield into the dialogue be-
cause they believe that only “R” rated films will attract a teenage audi-
ence, and all self-respecting rappers make sure that their CD’s obtain a
“Parental Advisory” label.  But whatever its effects in particular cases,
the act of disparagement is distinguishable from criticism, and creates
identifiable dangers when performed by government.  The distinction,
and the dangers, are illustrated by two decisions that relied on Pico,
Bowman v. Bethel-Tate Board of Education76 and Bell v. U-32 Board of Edu-
cation,77 both of which involved the prohibition of a student-per-
formed play.  In Bowman, the school board prohibited performance of
the play because it glorified cowardice and denigrated patriotism.  This
decision represented symbolic governmental speech that disparaged
the ideas presented by the play, declaring them beyond the bounds of
acceptable discourse.  After such a prohibition, only an unusually au-
dacious student would have stood up in class and argued that the play
was full of good ideas, and only a preternaturally audacious student
would have suggested that patriotism deserves to be denigrated.  In
contrast, the school board in Bell prohibited performance on the
ground that the play was not appropriate for the entire school commu-
nity, but kept it in the school library and the high school curriculum.
74. See CEDRIC BELFRAGE, THE AMERICAN INQUISITION, 1945-1960 (1973); ROBERT
GRIFFITH, THE POLITICS OF FEAR: JOSEPH R. MCCARTHY AND THE SENATE (1987); ELLEN
SCHRECKER, MANY ARE THE CRIMES: MCCARTHYISM IN AMERICA (1998).
75. Pico v. Bd. of Educ., 638 F.2d at 410 (noting the school board members’ fear
that announcing the names of the objectionable books before removing them from the
shelves would cause a run on these books by the students).
76. Bowman v. Bethel-Tate Bd. of Educ., 610 F. Supp. 577 (S.D. Ohio 1985) (in-
validating the school board’s action as a violation of the First Amendment). See supra
text accompanying notes 52-55.
77. Bell v. U-32 Bd. of Educ., 630 F. Supp. 939 (D. Vt. 1986) (upholding the
school board’s action against a First Amendment challenge). See supra text accompany-
ing notes 63-67.
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This decision, although content-based, was an acceptable exercise of
administrative authority because no disparagement was involved; the
reason given did not suggest that the ideas in the play were unaccept-
able.  After that decision, it would not have been difficult at all for a
student to express approval of the play’s ideas, or even disapproval of
the school board decision; in fact, the play’s retention in the curricu-
lum can be seen as an invitation to do so.
III. DISPARAGEMENT AND THE CONUNDRUMS OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
Judge Newman’s concept of disparagement thus provides a coher-
ent principle for resolving Pico, and a significant number of other First
Amendment cases.  There are, however, some complex implications of
the principle that merit further exploration.  To return to the Pico case
itself, once the act of removing school books for ideological reasons is
identified as disparagement or the suppression of ideas, it is easy
enough to conclude that Eldridge Cleaver’s condemnations of racism,
or Desmond Morris’ theories of evolution, or even Kurt Vonnegut’s
insouciance, should not be disparaged.  But what about a book endors-
ing totalitarianism, slavery, the Taliban’s position on women, or the
annihilation of the Jews?  Surely such books could be removed from
the library on the basis that their ideas were unacceptable.  And surely
these ideas are disparaged in a large majority of the classrooms in
America.  Still other ideas that are beyond the ordinary thought
processes of modern individuals, such as human sacrifice or the ritual
consumption of unwanted children, would be disparaged if they were
ever to arise as real possibilities.  Viewpoint discrimination and politi-
cal criticism are indeed distinguishable from disparagement, and there
are many ideas that can be validly rejected or criticized but not dispar-
aged.  There are other ideas, however, that we feel should be dispar-
aged, that are indeed regarded as beyond the bounds of acceptable
political discourse.
This suggests that the disparagement principle operates within a
delimited area.  It does not cover the entire range of possible ideas, but
only those that are the subjects of present political controversy. The
essential principle is that the government must not disparage ideas
that are actively accepted and advanced by some non-negligible group
within civil society.  Those ideas must be treated with respect in the
basic First Amendment interest of fostering, rather than suppressing,
political debate.  Government speakers are not required to subsidize
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all such ideas, and indeed they are permitted to criticize them, but
must not attempt to extirpate them.  In other words, it is only civil
society, not government, that may deem an idea unacceptable and ex-
ile it from the realm of the conceivable.  Once civil society has done so,
however, the government may follow.  As citizens, we expect our
schools and our political leaders to condemn racism, genocide and
dictatorship. By doing so, they do not foreclose an active debate but
rather reaffirm the principles that our society acknowledges as its
foundations.
The limits on the disparagement principle, it must be
remembered, do not represent the limits of the First Amendment in its
entirety, but only its limits in the context of government speech and
symbolic governmental action.  When coercive governmental action is
involved, those limits expand to the entire range of human thought.
Thus, the First Amendment, as currently understood, prohibits the
state from criminalizing any ideas or forbidding their dissemination.
Indeed, citizens are indeed permitted to make statements favoring ra-
cism, genocide, human sacrifice and ritual murder.  While, there are
other limits on speech, such as the speech-action distinction, within
the realm of ideas the government may not apply coercive force.  The
common phrase that is used to express this view is that we are commit-
ted to defending the rights of those whose thoughts we hate.78   This
principle does not extend to government subsidy or approval, how-
ever.  If civil society unites in finding certain ideas hateful, a govern-
ment that is responsive to that society is not required to support those
ideas, or to avoid the inevitable criticisms of them that result from its
assertion of basic social values.
Defining the limits of disparagement in this manner provides at
least a partial solution to the complex problem of values inculcation in
the public schools.  The fact that schools inevitably embody values in
their curricula and inculcate those values as an inextricable part of the
educational process does not mean that they need to disparage any
values that they do not choose to inculcate.  A school board does in-
deed have the authority to construct a curriculum that does not in-
clude Soul on Ice or Slaughterhouse Five, but it is not permitted to
disparage the ideas presented in those books by declaring that those
ideas are beyond the limits of acceptable discourse.  Such disparage-
78. See ARYEH NEIER, DEFENDING MY ENEMY: AMERICAN NAZIS, THE SKOKIE CASE, AND
THE RISKS OF FREEDOM (1979).
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ment is not necessary to the process of curricular decision making.
But there are other ideas, presented for example in Mein Kampf,79 or
John Calhoun’s Disquisition on Government,80 that must indeed be
disparaged in order to create any plausible curriculum in our society
that addresses political issues.
Thus there appear to be three levels of governmental judgment
emerging from our conception of free speech.  With respect to all
ideas, whatever their character or their acceptability in civil society, the
government must not employ coercive force; it must not forbid citizens
from believing or expressing these ideas.  It may, however, disparage
those ideas that civil society has placed beyond the limits of acceptable
discourse.  Ideas that are within those limits, however, may not be dis-
paraged; when the government speaks, it must be careful not to indi-
cate that such ideas are unacceptable.  Again, it is civil society, not
government, that can declare ideas unacceptable.  But while govern-
ment speakers may not disparage these ideas, they are not required to
be neutral with respect to them.  In conducting political debate and
providing funds to private citizens or operating institutions, they may
exercise both content and viewpoint discrimination, selecting those
ideas they want to subsidize or endorse, and those they want to ignore
or criticize.  Finally, there are certain contexts, such as judicial or ad-
ministrative adjudications and funding for electoral speech, where
strict neutrality is required and the government may not indicate any
content or viewpoint preferences at all.  These are specialized contexts,
and the rules that govern them tend to emerge from the policies par-
ticular to those contexts, rather than from the First Amendment.81
Thus the requirement of neutrality in adjudication comes from consid-
erations of due process rather than from freedom of speech.  Similarly,
the requirement that government be strictly neutral in funding speech
related to elections emerges from our concept of elections.82
Distinguishing between the disparagement of acceptable ideas,
which is constitutionally prohibited, and the disparagement of unac-
79. ADOLF HITLER, MEIN KAMPF (Ralph Manheim, trans., 1999).
80. JOHN C. CALHOUN, A DISQUISITION ON GOVERNMENT (Richard K. Cralle, ed.
1943).
81. For a contrary view, see Shiffrin, supra note 68, at 622-40.  Shiffrin argues for
the necessity of an eclectic approach to government speech, but one reason why he
finds a lack of unifying First Amendment principles may be that he tries to derive the
rules regarding speech in the electoral process from the First Amendment.
82. See Edwin Baker, Campaign Expenditures and Free Speech, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 1 (1998); Rubin, supra note 73, at 758-64.
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ceptable ideas, which is permitted, is a plausible way to resolve the
characteristic dilemma of judicial review, namely, the conflict between
protecting rights and validating the majoritarian political process.  To
allow acceptable ideas to be disparaged in public schools would sanc-
tion a serious intrusion on the protections afforded to free speech.
But to forbid schools from teaching their students that racism or geno-
cide are unacceptable would be politically untenable and morally re-
pugnant.  A coherent constitutional rule, however, should be justified
by considerations that run deeper than either political expediency or
vague intuition.  In fact, the prohibition of disparagement, and the
limitation of its range to acceptable ideas, is justified by some of the
most basic elements of our political morality.  In particular, the justifi-
cation flows from a consideration of the purposes and dangers of the
modern administrative state.
The particular danger of disparagement, as discussed above, in-
volves the government’s role as a speaker, rather than its role in gen-
eral or the general impact of disparagement.  Any government is
capable, virtually by definition, of deploying coercive force,83 but it is
established by our First Amendment principles that our government
may not deploy coercive force against ideas, however unacceptable.
Similarly, the disparagement of one’s ideas may be hurtful, but it is
inherent in a system that allows free speech to every citizen that virtu-
ally every idea will be disparaged by someone, and that certain ideas
will be disparaged by a great many people.  While the conflicting de-
mands of freedom and civility may be resolved in a variety of ways, it is
clear that the freedom of each person to speak necessarily implies the
freedom to disparage the ideas of others.  The concern raised by al-
lowing government to disparage unacceptable ideas, therefore, does
not stem from the role of government per se, or from the abstract
notion of disparagement, but from the government’s particular role as
speaker and its ability to suppress speech by disparagement to an ex-
tent that is equivalent or greater84 to that which it could achieve by
coercive force.
One of the most notable features that distinguishes the adminis-
trative state from its traditional predecessors is the prevalence of gov-
83. See MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 53-56, 212-17 (Guenther Roth & Clause
Wittich, eds. 1978).
84. For an argument that the government can suppress ideas more effectively
through ideology than through the use of force, see MAX HORKHEIMER AND THEODOR
ADORNO, DIALECTIC OF ENLIGHTENMENT 120-67 (John Cumming, trans., 1996).
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\46-1-2\NLR109.txt unknown Seq: 24 24-FEB-03 14:04
272 NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46
ernment speech and the potential impact of that speech on the values
associated with the First Amendment.  A basic premise that underlies
our First Amendment theory is the autonomy of civil society.85  Free-
dom of speech is described as serving the deontological value of al-
lowing people to develop their own ideas, and the instrumental value
of permitting the criticism and consequent control of governmental
actors.  Both these values, however, assume that there exists a space
between government and society and that government does not domi-
nate the process of opinion and idea formation to an extent that
independent thought becomes impossible.86  In pre-modern Europe,
domination of this sort was  beyond the capacity of any government.
Religion was the predominant source of social values and religious au-
thorities were largely independent of the state.  Before the Reforma-
tion, the Catholic Church served as an independent source of social
and political authority, often confronting royal governments, and
sometimes prevailing over them.87  The Reformation diminished its
role, but often in favor of individual conscience and autonomy.88
Throughout this period, education outside of the home was provided
almost exclusively by religious organizations.89  In addition, much of
the process of opinion formation occurred in localized or family inter-
actions beyond the reach of any large-scale institution.  While pre-mod-
ern civil society can be fairly described as dominated by tradition, this
was actually a welter of different traditions, creating a diffuse civil cul-
ture that resisted centralized control.  Quite apart from the indepen-
dence of religious institutions and the decentralization of culture, pre-
85. On the concept of civil society, see JEAN COHEN & ANDREW ARATO, CIVIL SOCI-
ETY AND POLITICAL THEORY (1992); NIKLAS LUHMANN, THE DIFFERENTIATION OF SOCIETY
(1982).
86. See Jeremy Waldron, Autonomy and Perfectionism in Raz’s Morality of Freedom, 62
S. CAL. L. REV. 1097 (1989).
87. See NORMAN CANTOR, THE CIVILIZATION OF THE MIDDLE AGES 417-33 (rev. ed.
1994); BRIAN TIERNEY, THE CRISIS OF CHURCH AND STATE 1050-1300 (1964); I.S. ROBIN-
SON, Church and Papacy, in THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL POLITICAL THOUGHT
252 (J.H. Burns, ed., 1988); J.A. WATT, Spiritual and Temporal Powers, in id. at 367.
88. See JAROSLAV PELIKAN, SPIRIT VERSUS STRUCTURE: LUTHER AND THE INSTITUTIONS
OF THE CHURCH (1968); QUENTIN SKINNER, THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN POLITICAL
THOUGHT, VOL 2: THE AGE OF REFORMATION (1978); MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT
ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM (Talcott Parsons trans., 1958).
89. See JAMES BOWEN, A HISTORY OF WESTERN EDUCATION (1972-81); HARRY GOOD
& JAMES TELLER, A HISTORY OF WESTERN EDUCATION (3d ed. 1969).  With respect to the
medieval period, see JOSEPH AND FRANCES GIES, LIFE IN A MEDIEVAL CITY 154-65 (1969);
NICHOLAS ORME, ENGLISH SCHOOLS IN THE MIDDLE AGES (1973).
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modern states lacked the administrative capacities to exercise much
impact on civil society; for many of them, raising the finances necessary
to keep their basic operations intact was about as much as they could
manage.
The advent of the administrative state creates the possibility that
government will dominate and control the conceptual process of civil
society, eliminating the independence that is crucial for our concep-
tion of the First Amendment.  With the secularization of culture, relig-
ious organizations have declined as independent sources of influence
and no equivalent institutions  have arisen in their place.  Education is
now provided largely by state-run schools.90  With the growth of trans-
portation and communications networks, local traditions have been re-
placed by a national culture dominated by large-scale institutions, most
notably the national media.  Modern governments generally possess an
enormous administrative apparatus and the capacity to operate and
expand that apparatus quite effectively.  By taking advantage of the vast
potential of the public schools for indoctrination, and taking control
of the national media, it becomes possible for a modern state to domi-
nate civil society, and suppress, if not eliminate, its ability to generate
independent ideas.91  This was certainly the aspiration of twentieth
century totalitarian regimes,92 and one that George Orwell captured in
his description of “Newspeak.”93
But the same conditions that generate the dangers of the adminis-
trative state are also responsible for its necessity.  Whether we like it or
not, society has become secular and tradition has been attenuated, if
not eliminated, as a source of justification and social meaning.  An
elaborate administrative apparatus is absolutely necessary to meet the
citizenry’s demands for social justice and material well-being.  Despite
the dangers that it poses, the administrative state is not an affliction
that has been visited upon us, but the product of consistent citizen
demands over a two-hundred year long period.  To focus solely on the
field involved in Pico, education is now regarded as a necessity, if not a
90. See Bowen, supra note 89; LAWRENCE CREMIN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
SCHOOL: PROGRESSIVISM IN AMERICAN EDUCATION, 1876-1957 (1961); BRUCE CURTIS,
BUILDING THE EDUCATIONAL STATE (1988); Good & Teller, supra note 89.
91. See JURGEN HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS (Thomas McCarthy, ed., 1975).
92. See HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 305-479 (rev. ed. 1973).
93. GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 at 246 (1949); (“It was intended that when Newspeak
had been adopted once and for all . . a heretical thought — that is, a thought diverging
from the principles of Ingsoc — should be literally unthinkable, at least so far as
thought is dependent on words.”).
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right;94 and one of the citizenry’s most persistent demands is that more
and better education be provided.  In modern society, however, educa-
tion can only be provided by the state through a complex administra-
tive apparatus.  As noted above, education inevitably involves the
inculcation of values.  Thus, the modern state has obtained this role in
response to circumstances and citizen demands.  Some states may em-
ploy education as a means of political indoctrination, but the develop-
ment of extensive public education systems cut across every type of
modern administrative state, from totalitarian to democratic.
The boundary of the disparagement principle traces the lines of
equilibrium between these opposing considerations.  If we are to have
an educational system, it must be based on values.  Values that are dia-
metrically opposed to those that form the basis of the system are neces-
sarily disparaged.  Commitment to tolerance requires the
condemnation of racism, commitment to equality requires the con-
demnation of God-given social hierarchy, commitment to democracy
requires the condemnation of totalitarianism, commitment to the
value of knowledge requires condemnation of obscurantism. But the
dangers posed by the administrative state’s capacity to overwhelm the
conceptual process of civil society suggests that this condemnation
should go no further than is absolutely necessary.  Values that are not
foundational, that are not the basis of a virtually unanimous social con-
sensus, can still be presented, but the opposing values should not be
condemned.  To do so impedes the debate about these values within
civil society and employs the enormous influence of a state-run educa-
tional system to suppress ideas that are under active consideration, and
which deserve the opportunity to prevail.
Within this rationale for the boundaries of the disparagement
principle, however, there remains a tension between the educational
system’s ability to inculcate non-foundational values and the effort to
preserve political debate within civil society.  Over time, the inculca-
tion of values, even without disparagement of the opposing values, can
have the same effect as disparagement.  To ignore an idea while
presenting its opposite is an implicit condemnation, and while its im-
mediate impact is likely to be weaker than disparagement, its cumula-
tive impact, over time, may be equally great.  Underlying this
94. It appears as a right in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 26.
For the text of this document, see BASIC DOCUMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Ian
Brownlie ed., 1967); LOUIS HENKIN, ET AL., BASIC DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT TO INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (2d ed. 1987).
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phenomenon is a challenge to the basic First Amendment premise that
civil society is separate from government and possesses conceptual au-
tonomy.  If the schools inculcate values, particularly non-foundational
values, they may give the state the capacity to overwhelm the concep-
tual process that the disparagement principle is designed to protect.
These considerations suggest that the disparagement principle
cannot rest on the idea that civil society can be protected from govern-
mental influence.  Government is inevitably a major force in the pro-
cess of opinion formation; even if one distinguishes it from civil
society, as a convenient heuristic, one must acknowledge that the two
realms are intimately linked and that the effects of government on civil
society are profound.  Those who are in an optimistic mood, or live in
a nation that has treated them with kindness, may describe this govern-
mental influence as education.  Those who are more mistrustful, or
who have felt the jackboot of authority press down upon their necks,
may describe it as propaganda or indoctrination.  However, it is impos-
sible to deny that the massive, comprehensive government of the ad-
ministrative state impacts greatly on debates within civil society.
The solution to this is to recognize that the disparagement princi-
ple is based on political morality and not on instrumental social policy
considerations.  Government may inevitably influence civil society
while also acting as if civil society possesses a basic conceptual auton-
omy.  As citizens, we want government to avoid the effort to suppress
non-foundational ideas, even though we know that it will nonetheless
do so by virtue of its endorsement of their opposites.  While this is a
moral position, it is neither fanciful nor ineffective from an empirical
perspective.  A government that conforms to a political morality that
precludes it from suppressing ideas will do so nonetheless, but it will
do so slowly.  What it will not do – what this political morality precludes
– is a rapid, focused effort to extirpate the disfavored ideas.  And it is
this time scale difference that comprises most of the distinction be-
tween liberty and oppression.  The gradual influences that transform
people’s views simply contribute to the inevitable process of intersub-
jective opinion formation.  Since human beings are socially con-
structed, their opinions, although individually held, are never
individually generated, but always derive from a complex social matrix.
This process is experienced as ordinary life, not as oppression.  In psy-
chological terms, individuals internalize these gradual influences and
perceive them simply as their own genuinely-held opinions.  The impo-
sition of values in brief periods of time, however, will be perceived by
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people as an external force that conflicts with their genuinely-held
views and their essential selves.  They may resist, or they may comply,
but they will feel that they have been oppressed and that they have lost
their liberty.
One could argue that they have lost their liberty in either case
because a governing entity has imposed its views upon them.  But this
is essentially a false consciousness argument.  The difficulty with it is
that there is no convincing definition of human liberty that does not
involve people’s ability to choose what they actually and presently de-
sire.  Moreover, people’s experiences matter a great deal; whatever
other moral positions one adopts, the difference between feeling op-
pressed by government and not experiencing this feeling should be
regarded as significant.  Finally, an interactive government, of the kind
that exists in modern Western nations, will be strongly influenced by
its citizenry over any substantial period of time.  Elected officials must
appeal to the populace, and appointed administrators, unless they oc-
cupy highly insulated positions, will be subject to a variety of pressures
and pragmatic limitations.  Thus, the values that such governments im-
pose over extended periods will contain a large admixture of the citi-
zenry’s own desires and, for this reason as well, will seem more like
guidance than oppression.
CONCLUSION
Judge Newman’s concurring opinion in Pico states a more satisfac-
tory rationale for the decision in the case than the Supreme Court’s
plurality opinion.  By focusing on the issue of the disparagement or
suppression of ideas, Judge Newman was able to develop a more worka-
ble principle for dealing with library book removal than the plurality’s
right to receive rationale.  More importantly, he articulated a principle
that is not restricted to school libraries, as the plurality opinion was,
but cuts across all aspects of public education and government speech
in general.  Most important of all, the disparagement principle enables
us to understand and partially resolve some of the complexities for
First Amendment theory that are created by the administrative state.
The administrative state is a fertile source of complexities because it is
new, often newer than the political conceptions which we employ to
deal with it.  This is certainly the case with the concept of free speech
which, in its classic formulation, presumes a separation between gov-
ernment and civil society that no longer exists.  To preserve the advan-
tages of the administrative state, but guard against its dangers, that
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concept needs to be re-thought.  One of the great values of Judge New-
man’s disparagement principle is that it represents a step in that
direction.
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